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ABSTRACT
Conflicts between the pilot and the automation, when pilots
detect but do not understand them, cause “automation sur-
prise” situations and jeopardize flight safety. We conducted
an experiment in a 3-axis motion flight simulator with 16 pi-
lots equipped with an eye-tracker to analyze their behavior
and eye movements during the occurrence of such a situation.
The results revealed that this conflict engages participant’s at-
tentional abilities resulting in excessive and inefficient visual
search patterns. This experiment confirmed the crucial need
to design solutions for detecting the occurrence of conflict-
ual situations and to assist the pilots. We therefore proposed
an approach to formally identify the occurrence of “automa-
tion surprise” conflicts based on the analysis of “silent mode
changes” of the autopilot. A demonstrator was implemented
and allowed for the automatic trigger of messages in the cock-
pit that explains the autopilot behavior. We implemented a
real-time demonstrator that was tested as a proof-of-concept
with 7 subjects facing 3 different conflicts with automation.
The results shown the efficacy of this approach which could
be implemented in existing cockpits.
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INTRODUCTION
The integration of automation began in the early 1960s with
systems that aimed at stabilizing the aircraft through a me-
chanical manipulation of the flight control surfaces. Automa-
tion technology continues to develop and become more and
more integrated in aviation thanks to the creation of digi-
tal computers and the desire to render aircraft more reliable,
more precise, safer, more economical and more productive.
Following such developments, the accident rate dropped from
more than 35 accidents per one million flight to finally reach
the actual one of 0.66 accidents per one million flights [2], an
unprecedented improvement in aviation safety records.
This improvement in safety records was unquestionably
driven by the development of automation in aviation. For
example, Breen [3] showed that the introduction of ground
proximity warning systems led to a decrease in the controlled
flight into terrain accident rate. Norman [25] supported and
generalized this idea by stating that human performance was
aided by the improvements in aviation safety resulting from
the integration of automation. However, the accident rate
never managed to reach the perfect zero accident per million
flights, as it has been shown that the tendency is stagnation at
the rate reached in the 1980s [2].
While automation helped make aviation safer, its integration
in civil commercial aviation flights was immediately followed
by a series of crashes due to unexpected problems. For exam-
ple, in 1972, a L-1011 crashed into the Florida Everglades
after a disconnection of an autopilot function while the pilots
were dealing with a landing gear problem [1]. This event,
among others, caused great worry among human factors re-
searchers in the 1980s. In 1989, the Air Transport Associ-
ation (ATA), showed its concern towards these issues: “Al-
though many of these benefits have been realized, serious
questions have arisen and incidents/accidents have occurred
which question the underlying assumptions that the maximum
available automation is ALWAYS appropriate or that we un-
derstand how to design automated systems so that they are
fully compatible with the capabilities and limitations of the
humans in the system”.
Following this report, human factors issues and the interac-
tion between automation and human have been studied. It
was identified that the link between the operator and the au-
tomated system was the fragile segment of the overall system
[34]. Indeed, it was shown that the human operator had not
been taken as an element of the overall system when design-
ing automated systems, thus, these problems were the result
of “a failure to design for a coordinated team effort across
human and machine agents as one cooperative system” [34].
However, despite the research aimed to design automated sys-
tems and training their operators, automation-related prob-
lems persisted.
More recently, on June 2009, Air France flight AF447 crashed
in international waters of the Atlantic Ocean while flying
from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. The French safety board for
accident investigation found that the inadvertent icing of the
pitot tubes led to abnormal speed measures and false indica-
tions in the cockpit [4]. Erroneously believing the aircraft in
stall, the autopilot was automatically self-disconnected. The
pilots tried to carried out the standard procedure following the
disconnection of the autopilot. However, the surprise result-
ing from the autopilot’s disconnection, the inexperience of
the pilots, and multiple other causal and contributory factors
led the aircraft to actually stall without enabling the crew to
manage it. This recent failure by the crew of a well-renowned
company in managing an automation-related incident shows
that even after 40 years of utilisation of automation in civil
commercial aviation, human factors issues linked to automa-
tion are still a significant safety concern.
The lesson to be learnt from these unexpected problems and
human factors research is that the relationship between the
pilot and the autopilot of civil aviation aircraft is prone to
conflicts. Studies towards the development of a predictive
pilot-automation conflict tool should have to be conducted,
and could result in an appropriate solution to help solving
and predicting conflicts. In order to accomplish this general
objective, we propose to conduct in the next section a further
review of the literature to better understand pilot-autopilot co-
operation breakdown.
Conflict with automation: “automation surprises”
The analysis of air safety accidents and experiments con-
ducted in flight simulators [14] revealed that the occurrence
of a conflict impairs human operators performance. Conflicts
are defined as the impossibility for one agent (e.g. a pilot) to
reach a goal that matters [6, 12, 16]. This impossibility may
be the consequence of limited resources, incoherent data in
the user interface, or a contradictory action of another agent
such as a crew member or the autopilot [12]. Indeed, con-
flicts do not solely occur between humans operators, but also
involve pilots and automation [12, 39]. Such conflicts are
likely to occur as pilots and automation, which have differ-
ent “logic”, may take over from each other on flight guid-
ance. Therefore, it is worth noting that the understanding and
the use of modern autopilots requires the crew to master its
complex behavior (e.g. up to 42 states and 268 states transi-
tions for the Airbus 340). Some authors have postulated that
insufficient pilot mental models of the automation and poor
automation feedback [8, 20] can lead to the following con-
flicting situations:
• “Indirect mode changes” [21] or “automated behavior”
[17]: automation automatically changes its behavior in ab-
sence of any pilot’s action (e.g. automatic go-around dur-
ing landing, independently of the pilot’s will);
• “Unintended side effects” [21]: a single pilot’s action trig-
gers a cascade of autopilot state changes (e. g. an action on
the horizontal guidance mode modifies automatically the
autopilot vertical guidance behavior);
• “Inhibited behavior” [17] or “operator authority limits”
[21]: the pilot’s actions are automatically “cancelled” by
the system and have no effect on autopilot behavior.
Conflicts are not limited to their structural/formal aspects (i.e.
the impossibility for the pilot to reach his initial goal) but
also share psychological and cognitive attributes. Conflicts
with automation can remain unnoticed and can lead to er-
roneous situation awareness (“mode error”) [15, 19, 33] or
attentional tunneling [12] as revealed by eye tracking mea-
surements. Conflicts with automation, when detected but not
understood, may also provoke “breakdowns in the interac-
tion between human operators and automated systems. The
result can be situations where the operator is surprised by
the behavior of the automation” [34]. Sarter, Woods, and
Billings [34] defined this conflicting situation as “automation
surprise”. For instance, the concept of opacity of automation
was introduced to illustrate that automation surprise leads pi-
lots to questioning the system’s behavior [38]: What is it do-
ing now? Why did it do that? What is it going to do next? It
was postulated that occurrence of such situation could sum-
mon up pilots cognitive resources leading the crew to persist
in solving a minor conflict with automation [1] “instead of
switching to another means or a more direct means to ac-
complish their flight path management goals” [40]. Though
users’ surprise and confusion phenomenons were largely ad-
dressed using eye tracking for usability studies (see [28] for
a good review), no such research was achieved in the avia-
tion domain. Indeed, to the authors’ knowledge, “automa-
tion surprise” has mainly led to conceptual studies, and no
studies in flight simulators with objective measurements have
been conducted. We propose to fill this gap by performing an
eye-tracking study to better understand pilot’s cognitive per-
formance when facing such a situation and pave the way to
design assistance tools.
Present study
The general objectives of this research are:
• To contribute to research in solving automation surprises
problems in aviation;
• To evaluate the impact of automation surprise on pilot’s
eye movements as an indirect measure of cognitive perfor-
mance [28];
• To develop and to test real-time solutions that could be im-
plemented in existing cockpit.
To meet these goals we first designed an experimental sce-
nario involving a conflict with automation. This event was
designed such that it would be easily detected by pilots and
thus provoked “automation surprise”. The objective of this
first experiment was to collect behavioral data, especially eye
tracking data, to analyze pilot’s cognitive performance when
facing such a situation. We then proposed an approach to for-
mally detect conflicts and to automatically trigger auditory
messages to help pilots solve them. These solutions were im-
plemented in real-time in our flight simulator and led to a
proof of concept testing.
AUTOMATION SURPRISE EXPERIMENT
Material and Methods
Participants
Sixteen healthy volunteers (two females; mean age = 30.8,
SD = 14; mean flight experience = 1391 hours, range 55–
9000; mean automated flight desk experience 200 hours,
range 15–700), all pilots from the French Aerospace engi-
neering School (ISAE) participated in this experiment after
giving written informed consent. Participants had good audi-
tory acuity and normal or corrected-to-normal vision accord-
ing to their pilot medical certificate.
Flight simulator
The experiment was conducted with the ISAE flight simula-
tor (figure 1). The user interface was composed of the classi-
cal electronic flight instrument displays including the primary
flight display (PFD) and the navigation display. The partici-
pants had a side-stick, rudder pedals, thrust levers and a Flight
Control Unit (FCU) to control the flight guidance. The FCU
was dedicated to interacting with the autopilot via four knobs
(speed, heading, altitude, vertical speed). The autopilot (ver-
tical and horizontal profile management) was engaged and
disconnected via a push button “AP” on the FCU. Autopilot
disconnection was associated with a dedicated auditory warn-
ing (“cavalry charge”). The auto-thrust (speed management)
was engaged and disengaged via a push button “ATHR” on
the FCU.
ND PFD 
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Figure 1: ISAE 3-axis motion flight simulator. FCU: Flight
Control Unit. PFD: Primary Flight Display. ND: Navigation
Display.
For the purpose of the experiment, we designed a realistic
auto-flight system that replicated poor automation designs
from different civilian transportation aircraft (see [27] for a
formal description of our autopilot).
• The autopilot had one lateral mode (“Heading”) and three
vertical modes (“positive vertical speed”, “negative vertical
speed”, “null vertical speed”). Note that the vertical speed
was null (i.e. 0 ft/min) when the autopilot reached the tar-
get altitude or when the pilot pushed the vertical speed
knob to level off. These different flight modes were dis-
played on the upper part of the PFD;
• The autopilot automatically disconnected during overspeed
or low speed/stall events. The overspeed value depends on
three possible flaps configurations 180 knots, 220 knots
and 330 knots respectively. These events triggered the
speed auditory warning (triple chime) that inhibited the au-
topilot disconnection auditory warning;
• The aircraft leveled off in case of inconsistent program-
ming of the vertical speed with regards to the target altitude
(i.e. it was not possible to “climb” with a negative vertical
speed or to descend with a positive vertical speed);
• The autopilot reversed from level off or negative vertical
speed to positive vertical speed when the aircraft speed was
5 knots below overspeed. This mode reversion was dedi-
cated to avoid a possible overspeed.
Experimental scenario
The scenario, which included the occurrence of one conflict
with automation, lasted 10 minutes. The simulated ATC (Air
Traffic Control) cleared the pilots for take-off from Blagnac
airport (Toulouse, France) and the airplane was vectored reg-
ularly according to a flight plan that was identical for each
participant. At 9000 ft, the ATC required the participant to
“accelerate 325 knots, descend 5000 feet with a -1000 ft/min
vertical speed” to avoid an incoming aircraft flying at the
same flight level. As the speed reached 325 knots, the autopi-
lot reversed to positive vertical speed mode (+1000 ft/min) to
anticipate potential overspeed (330 knots - see previous sec-
tion for autopilot logic). This situation eventually led the air-
plane to level off instead of descending as the selected target
altitude (i.e. 5000 feet) could not be reached with a positive
vertical speed (figure 2).
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Figure 2: The “impossible descent” automation surprise: the
ATC required the participants to descend but with an exces-
sive speed. The combination of two autopilot behaviors led
the aircraft to level off to prevent overspeed.
Procedure
The participants had a 20-minute tutorial presentation that de-
tailed the flight simulator user interfaces (PFD, FCU, etc.)
with a special focus on the different nominal and off-nominal
autopilot behaviors. In order to check the understanding of
the tutorial, the participants had to comment on each slide of
the tutorial and to recall the autopilot behavior. The volun-
teers completed a one-hour training session in the flight sim-
ulator that included basic manual flying, landings, take-offs,
stall and overspeed recovery. They were then trained to inter-
acting with the autopilot and had to set different parameters
according to ATC instructions (e.g. “Supaero32, steer 200 de-
grees, climb 6000 feet, vertical speed +1000 ft/min”). Even-
tually, off-nominal situations such as autopilot automatic dis-
connection due to overspeed/stall events, inconsistent FCU
programming, level off to vertical speed mode reversion were
induced and the participants were told to recover from them.
After the training, the participants had to repeat once the in-
teraction with the FCU and the autopilot behavior as well as
the different auditory warnings. The experimental scenario
was employed after this training.
Behavioral Data Analysis
Flight parameters, lateral and vertical modes of the autopi-
lot, and the pilot’s use of the FCU knobs were collected. The
volunteers were also debriefed right after the end of the ex-
periment and were told to explain their understanding of the
autopilot behavior during the descent and to comment on their
own actions. The analysis of these data allowed us to char-
acterize conflict occurrence and conflict solving. As stated in
the introduction section, conflict is defined as the impossibil-
ity to reach a goal that matters. In aeronautics, goals matter
for safety reasons such as avoiding loss of control and colli-
sions with terrain or with an incoming aircraft. In our exper-
imental scenario, we characterized conflict as unsolved when
volunteers failed to manage the vertical separation with the
incoming traffic according to aeronautical rule (the minimum
vertical separation between two aircraft is 500 ft). We char-
acterized conflict as solved when participants performed an
action that enabled them to recover from the critical situation
(i.e. reducing selected speed with the dedicated FCU knob or
manually taking over to continue on descending).
Ocular Data Analysis
Participant eye movements were recorded with a head-
mounted Pertech R© eye tracker. This lightweight non-
intrusive device has 0.25◦ of accuracy and a 50 Hz sampling
rate. After a 9-point calibration, a video capturing the visual
scene (eye tracker frontal camera) was available with the eye
gaze mapped on it. The vertical and horizontal movements in
degrees were also computed.
We detected ocular events of three possible types (blink, sac-
cade and fixation) with a dispersion-velocity based algorithm.
Gaze moving under 30◦/s with a dispersion threshold of 1◦
were considered as fixations. Other samples (if the eye was
not closed) were considered as saccades. The number of oc-
currences of these ocular events can be used to characterize
the visual processing behaviors. Thus, saccades of small am-
plitudes characterize local information search whereas those
of large amplitudes characterize global information search.
As for fixations, we distinguish two types of these ocular
events: short ones, the insufficient length of which does not
allow the participant to extract and process the associated
information and are therefore associated with information
search; and long ones, linked to sustained visual and cognitive
processing of fixated information. For more detailed discus-
sion on eye-fixation durations see Salthouse et al. [32]. As the
minimum time one needs to process basic interface informa-
tion depends on the interface/environment, the exact separat-
ing threshold is questionable. Short fixations are rarely con-
sidered as information processing in most of studies where
authors prefer to choose a threshold of 200 ms to detect a
meaningful fixation [24].
To express the balance between search and extrac-
tion/treatment of information, Goldberg and Kotval [18] pro-
posed to aggregate the fixation and saccade rates in a sole
ratio. Regis et al. [29] used a modified ratio to identify atten-
tional tunneling (i.e. excessive focus). Therefore, we decided
to follow this approach and to search for a particular ocular
behavior that would characterize the moment of conflict in
comparison to a nominal autopilot monitoring sequence. The
autopilot mode change (i.e. “level off” to “positive climb”)
triggered the onset of conflict. The baseline window was
chosen as the onset of conflict window, minus two minutes
of flight that brings it to a nominal autopilot monitoring ac-
tivity (i.e. basic autopilot supervision and interaction with
FCU knobs). We chose a 15-second window of basic pilot-
ing activity and compared it to the equivalent 15-second win-
dow following the rise of the conflict. We ran non-parametric
Wilcoxon tests on fixations and saccades of different lengths
(multiples of 20 ms – the intersampling period) to determine
what events best characterize the conflict occurrence. We se-
lected then all significant events and merged adjacent length-
values in the same class. We obtained thus three classes: sac-
cades of 120–160 ms duration, short fixations of 80–120 ms
duration and long fixations of 240-260 ms. According to the
previously mentioned above literature, we argue that the short
fixations are not long enough to extract the complex infor-
mation displayed in cockpit, and were therefore associated
with information search. Keeping these three classes, one
can modify the Goldberg and Kotval’s idea and compose a
new adapted “explore/exploit” ratio defined as
R =
saccades + short fixations
long fixations
.
On one hand, when participants explore the interface, the
number of saccades and short fixations increases while the
number of long fixations decreases; leading to an increase of
the ratio. On the other hand, when participants exploit the
interface, long fixations dominate, and the ratio decreases.
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of the ratio on three most
representative participants.
Results
The debriefing session revealed that 14 out of 16 pilots per-
ceived the abnormal behavior of the autopilot. Among them,
we found that only 7 out of 16 pilots understood the situation
and initiated the correct recovery procedure within the critical
time window of 30 s to avoid the incoming traffic (mean reac-
tion time 18 s after the onset of the automation surprise, SD=
9.3). Regarding the Wilcoxon Matched pairs tests over the
eye events, we found significant effects of the conflict corre-
sponding to an increase of the saccade rate (p < 0.05;Z1 =
2.04) and short fixations (p < 0.05;Z = 2.36) and a de-
crease in the long fixation rate (p < 0.001;Z = 3.40); (Fig.
3). In addition, the “explore/exploit” ratio over the 16 pi-
lots (Fig. 4) revealed a significant effect of the conflict with
higher ratio for the conflict situation comparing to the “base-
line” (p < 0.001;Z = 3.29) confirming that the conflict im-
plies higher exploration activity. In addition, a complemen-
tary analysis over the ratio did not reveal statistical difference
between the group of pilots who solved the conflict and the
group of pilots who did not.
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Figure 3: Group results (N=16) over the eye events rate. Oc-
ular data group results. *:p < 0.05; ***:p < 0.001.
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Figure 4: Group results (N=16) of the“Explore/exploit” ratio.
The conflict situation leads to an increase in the ratio value.
Ocular data group results. *:p < 0.05; ***:p < 0.001.
1Please note that Z is a converted “W” of the Wilcoxon test.
Conclusion
The objective of this experiment was to induce a conflict with
automation that would provoke “automation surprise”. Four-
teen pilots out of 16 declared that they perceived a conflict-
ing situation as the automation prevented them from descend-
ing to avoid a collision with an incoming aircraft. Whereas
conflict solving was “straightforward (i.e. reducing the se-
lected speed with the dedicated FCU knob), most of pilots
were stuck and failed to deal with the situation immediately.
Many participants made typical “fixation errors” [9] as they
persisted in disengaging and reengaging the autopilot (i.e. lat-
eral/vertical guidance) or dialing in vain the altitude or verti-
cal speed knobs on the FCU. Only 7 pilots managed to solve
the conflict but with a long mean reaction time (18s) consider-
ing that a collision with another aircraft was possible. More-
over, the analysis of ocular events revealed that the volunteers
exhibited higher visual search (more short fixations and sac-
cades) to the detriment of information processing (less fixa-
tions) during conflict in comparison to baseline. It is worth
noting that the ratio explore/exploit (i.e search vs. process)
dramatically increased and was five times higher during con-
flict than baseline. As the focus of attention is mainly top-
down and goal-driven [23], it was not surprising that partici-
pants’ poor mental model led to erratic eye movements dur-
ing the conflict. A complementary explanation to this ocular
behavior is that these unexpected “automation surprise” situ-
ations may have suddenly intensified pilots’ mental workload
and psychological stress. The occurrence of such stressors
are known to negatively impact the triangular circuit of atten-
tion (i.e. engage/shift/disengage) promoting either excessive
focus [11] or, on the contrary, an inability to focus and to fil-
ter out irrelevant information [37]. Indeed, “automation sur-
prise” led to an excessive but inefficient visual search that pre-
vents pilots from extracting the relevant information (i.e. the
speed indicator). Taken together, these results tend to show
that occurrence of automation surprise event summon up at-
tentional resources toward conflict solving. This is akin with
previous studies showing the link between conflicts, atten-
tional impairment [12] and persistence in erroneous course of
actions [1, 11]. One coud consider that this experiment was
not conducted with airline pilots but with light aircraft pi-
lots. However, we believe in the validity of our results as our
population of pilots were trained to deal with critical events
(e.g. overspeed) and had significant autoflight system exper-
tise as current light aircraft integrate complex autopilot and
electronic displays similar to modern transportation ones.
DETECTING AND SOLVING CONFLICTS
As shown the previous experiment, another step has to be
considered to mitigate the occurrence of human automation
conflicts in current cockpits. We therefore propose an ap-
proach, based on the analysis of flight parameters, pilots’ ac-
tions and autopilot states, to detect conflicts with automation
and to synthesize messages that provide explanations of the
autopilot behavior.
Conceptual approach
Many formal studies have proposed to detect conflict with
automation using finite state automata (e.g. [8, 13, 20]). Au-
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Figure 5: An example of z-scored explore/exploit ratio for three representative participants. The red line shows the formal arrival
of conflict.
thors generally implemented model checking techniques to
assess the design of pilot-autopilot interaction [5, 22] and to
predict automation surprise [8, 20, 30, 31]. However these
approaches were implemented off-line and in an ad hoc man-
ner as they required expert knowledge to implement pilots’
poor mental model of automation. Our approach differs from
previous work: the model is generic and does not represent
a specific conflicting situation. Moreover, we do not make
any assumptions about mental models to represent pilots im-
perfect knowledge. This eliminativist position is based on
the fact that inter-individual variability of these mental mod-
els is a barrier to formalization. Instead, we propose to de-
tect conflict using observable and objective facts. A tran-
sition from one automated flight guidance mode to another
could result either from a pilot’s action (e.g. dialing a FCU
knob) or from an autopilot/system event regulating its behav-
ior. Note that the conflicting situations described in the litera-
ture (i.e. “indirect mode changes”, “unintended side effects”,
“inhibited behavior” – see introduction) involve the firing of
an automated transition (e.g. overspeed) that interferes with
the crew’s goals [27]. Such automatic “silent transitions” are
likely to cause conflicts as the one observed during our first
experiment. Therefore, a reasonable approach to detect con-
flict in real-time is to track autopilot “automated/silent” mode
changes that were not provoked by any pilots’ actions. Once
conflicts are identified, a second challenge is to design solu-
tions to help pilots solving the conflict.
Chialastri [7] stated that “until the mid-1990’s, it appears that
pilots tried to adjust their behavior to a given challenge (new
automation), which was conceived regardless of their actual
need and deeply rooted habits.” Designers have developed
various ways of mitigating these situations such as improving
flight deck design to provide an efficient communication be-
tween the human operator and the aircraft. However, concur-
rently, problems linked to human limitations of attentional re-
sources also arose: “With the introduction of the glass cockpit,
the traditional flight instrument display was replaced by a dif-
ferent presentation encompassing more information, greater
flexibility, color coding and marking, but at the same time, it
could lead to information overload, as several parameters are
displayed in a compact area” [7]. As revealed in our experi-
ment pilots experienced excessive visual search and failed to
identify relevant information to understand autopilot behav-
ior. Autopilot user interface conveys very poor information
that does enable scrutability [36]: it only displays the au-
tomation current state (e.g. “climb”, “turn”) but it does not
provide any explanation about its behavior (i.e. what is the
reason for state changes). Therefore displaying information
about “why this autopilot behavior” could help pilots to solve
conflict with automation. This response could be done au-
tomatically through the analysis of the history of automation
state transitions and events that led to the conflicting situation.
Pilot’s assistant system implementation
We propose to design a pilot’s assistant system based on the
previous considerations. It is composed of two main ele-
ments: formal conflict detection and message synthesizer.
The following section describes the implementation of these
two elements.
The first step is to detect the formal conflict. Inconsistency
between the pilot’s settings and the autopilot behavior is a
key for conflict detection. We suppose that pilot is rational
and expresses his intentions trough the FCU interface. We
propose thus to compare in real-time pilots’ last settings in
the FCU and automation state. Differences between these two
pieces of information can emphasize a potential conflict. Let
VPG be the current goal state of the pilot (deduced from the
last FCU inputs); and let VAP be the current state vector of
the autopilot. When the autopilot is activated, this last vec-
tor represents the instructions sent by the automata to control
flight guidance.
We define the consistency checker (Fig. 6) – a module that
checks in real-time the consistency between the two goal state
vectors
(VPG, VAP ) ∈ (SPD,HDG,ALT, V/S,AP )2, where:
• SPD: the speed that can be selected;
• HDG: the heading that can be selected;
• ALT: the altitude that can be selected;
• V/S: the vertical speed that can be selected;
• AP: autopilot button position (On/Off);
The following example illustrates “the impossible descent”
conflict (see Fig 2). Before the occurrence of the conflict, we
have:
VPG = VAP = [325, 140, 9000,−1500,On].
The aircraft reaches a near-overspeed state, which involves
autopilot reversion to +1000 ft/min. The autopilot goal vector
is thus changed:
VPG = [325, 140, 9000,−1500,On]
VAP = [325, 140, 9000,+1000,On]
However, there is an inconsistency as the selected target
altitude, which is below the current altitude, cannot be
reached with a positive vertical speed. As a matter of fact, the
plane leveled-off, instead of descending as initially requested:
VPG = [325, 140, 9000,−1500,On];
VAP = [325, 140, 9000, +0,On].
We notice that VPG 6= VAP , therefore we may have a poten-
tially conflictual situation.
The second step is to automatically generate messages
adapted to the current situation. As long as autopilot docu-
mentation is available, it is possible to design a finite state
machine (FSM) that represents its behavior. Using this for-
mal description, an autopilot state manager module (see Fig.
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Figure 6: Consistency checker: comparison between pilot’s
inputs and autopilot outputs.
7) is able to track transitions between different states from the
autopilot automata. The knowledge of the last transition (ini-
tial state, resulting state, type of transition) informs us about
what event entailed the conflict.
Thus, we can generate an appropriate message. We defined
the following message syntax: “<current state> due to <last
transition>”. Pilot is then informed of the current state of the
autopilot, and of the transition that leads to the conflictual
state. Knowing that, he has many clues to deduce what action
must be undertaken. For example, if the autopilot reverses to
climb to avoid an overspeed, the message will be “<climbing
+1000> due to <near overspeed>”. Logically, the pilot will
be inclined to reduce speed. We used auditory message for
the sake of implementation ease.
Using this two steps, we implemented a way to warn the pilot
of an eventual conflictual situation with the autopilot, provid-
ing him also with information about the conflict’s origin to
make easier its resolution (Fig. 7):
• the consistency checker identifies potential conflict be-
tween pilot and autopilot using pilot’s entries and the au-
topilot flight settings;
• meanwhile the autopilot state manager module keeps track
of FSM states and transitions. When a potential conflict
arises, a message is generated to warn the pilot and to pro-
vide him a possible solution.
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Figure 7: The Consistency checker (1) checks for potential
conflicts (when autopilot is engaged), while autopilot state
manager (2) records states and transitions from the autopilot
automata. When a potential conflict is detected, and the pi-
lot’s actions are not solving it within 5 seconds, a message is
triggered (3), using history from autopilot state manager to
synthesize the correct message for the pilot.
Technically, we used a TCP/IP connection to collect pilot’s
settings on the autopilot via his actions on the four knobs of
the FCU (VPG). We inferred autopilot states from the orders
sent by the autopilot automata to the aircraft(VAP ).
Leaving some time for the pilot to react, we wait 5 seconds
before sending the message according to pilot’s reaction time
in critical situations (e.g. pull up alarm). The algorithm 1 and
the FSM model were implemented in Python programming
language to illustrate our proof of concept.
Algorithm 1: ASSISTANCEMANAGER
1 while AssistanceManager running do
2 if not VAP equals VPG then
3 Wait
4 if not VAP equals VPG then
5 generateMessage(current state,last transition)
Proof-of-concept
Motivation
The purpose of this part of the research was to conduct a
technical demonstration to test the efficiency of our algo-
rithm to detect automation surprise situations and to automat-
ically generate assisting solutions. The main objective was to
convince automation designers that straightforward solutions
could contribute to enhance flight safety. Hence, we did not
use eye tracking on purpose as to support evidence that con-
flict detection does not require the integration of such tech-
nology and that our solutions could be easily implemented in
current cockpits.
Participants and protocol
Seven new healthy volunteers (all men; mean age 31.0, SD
= 12.7; mean flight experience 609.7 hours, range 80–4000;
mean automated flight desk experience 150 hours, range 30–
200), all French defense staff from ISAE participated in this
proof of concept testing after giving written informed con-
sent. Participants had good auditory acuity and normal or
corrected-to-normal vision according to their pilots’ medical
certificate. The tutorial and training were identical to the first
experiment procedure. The scenario involved three conflict-
ing situations. The participants were cleared for takeoff from
Blagnac airport and at 1000 ft the ATC required them to steer
330 and to accelerate 176 knots.
Conflict 1: At 1200 ft, the ATC requests the participants to
level off to avoid an incoming traffic flying at 1800 ft. As
the speed reached 5 knots below maximum takeoff speed, the
autopilot climbs at +1000 ft/min to avoid possible overspeed.
This mode reversion could lead to a collision with the traffic
as the aircraft is not leveling off anymore. If the consistency
checker detected this, thus the following auditory message
would be synthesized: “<climbing at +1000 ft/min> due to
<near overspeed>”.
Conflict 2: When the aircraft cruises at 1 500 ft, it is cleared
to steer 143 degrees and to climb 11 000 ft. Cruising at 10
700 ft, the volunteers faces a strong jet stream provoking a
brief overspeed and thus disconnects automatically the au-
topilot: this situation leads to an overshoot of the target al-
titude (11 000 ft) as the aircraft keeps on climbing. If the
consistency checker detected this, thus the following auditory
message would be synthesized: “<autopilot disengaged>
due to <overspeed>”.
Conflict 3: The third conflict is identical to the “impossible
descent” situation used in the “automation surprise” experi-
ment (see Fig. 2). If the consistency checker detected this,
thus the following auditory message would be synthesized:
“<Level-off> due to <near overspeed>”.
Efficiency of the messages was assessed with flight parame-
ters and pilots’ actions on the FCU to determine whether the
conflicts were solved or not; and a questionnaire determining
whether it effectively helped the pilots.
Results and conclusion
The consistency checker detected in real-time the occurrence
of 20 conflicts out of 21 (i.e. 3 conflicts × 7 participants).
We did not find the cause of this conflict misidentification
possibly due to a temporary connection issue with the flight
simulator. All of the pilots managed to solve each conflict in
time with respect with the 500 ft separation rule. The debrief-
ing analysis confirmed that the synthesized messages helped
pilots to solve 16 out of 21 conflicts with a mean 5 s reac-
tion time (see table below). In the other five cases, they have
managed to solve the conflicts but declared that the messages
strengthened their strategy. All the participants applied the
expected procedure (reducing the selected speed, or recon-
necting the autopilot). One participant (for whom the con-
sistency checker failed to detect the conflict) took over the
automation and manually managed the conflict.
conflict # message helped out mean RT (s)
(out of 7)
1 5 6
2 5 2
3 6 7
The results of this technical demonstration are promising and
show that generic solutions could be easily implemented in
the cockpit. The consistency checker, based on the analysis
of “automatic mode changes”, allowed for the detection of
different conflictual situations. Moreover the messages objec-
tively helped pilots to solve conflicts and prevented them from
experiencing “automation surprise”: all participants managed
to deal with the conflicts with short reaction time. The par-
ticipants were unanimous in finding the messages to be more
efficient than the current user interface. However, the inter-
pretative value of these results remains limited as this proof-
of-concept was conducted with few participants facing only a
limited number of conflicts. Also we did not include a con-
trol group. There is a need to conduct a controlled experiment
involving more participants and other “automation surprise”
situations. Moreover, the design of the message has to be im-
proved and tested as, for instance, most of our participants
declared that the visual messages could be more efficient.
GENERAL CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This research intended to characterize pilots’ cognitive im-
pairment during “automation surprise” situations that are
known to jeopardize flight safety. The analysis of eye move-
ment revealed that such conflicts impair attentional abilities,
leading to an excessive visual search and in inability to ex-
tract relevant information. Interestingly enough, our results
shown that the explore/exploit ratio, derived from the work
of [18], was a simple but relevant way to indirectly measure
the state of surprise and confusion. Thus, this ratio could
be used to diagnose human operator states when facing a
much wider variety of safety-critical situations, such as any
technical breakdowns and related warnings that may surprise
them. Moreover the use of this ratio could be extended to
other domains (eg. driving) as its computation does not de-
pend on areas of interest but on how the eye moves and pro-
cesses information.To our knowledge, this study was the first
attempt to objectively characterize pilots’ performance and
ocular behavior when they “are surprised by the behavior of
their strong but silent machine partners” [34]. Correspond-
ing to Sarter’s intuitive reasoning, we therefore proposed to
consider “silent” mode transitions (i.e. triggered automati-
cally to self-regulate autopilot) as precursors of potential con-
flicts. Such an approach paved the way to the implementa-
tion of a real-time assistance system with minimum a priori
knowledge contrary to most common approaches [8, 20, 30,
31]. Though we have no guarantee that the formal model de-
tects all of the possible conflicts, the presented principle of
detecting a hidden transition is applicable to any finite-state
automata system commonly used in many critical systems
(e.g. nuclear powerplant, submarine, train). The verification
of completeness of this approach should be done by automa-
tion designers for each aircraft and validated with pilots dur-
ing experimental campaigns. Moreover, our assistant system
successfully synthesized appropriate messages and enabled
the pilots to scrutinize the autopilot model. For sake of sim-
plicity, we used auditory messages. However, this modality
may be less efficient in noisy cockpit especially under high
workload conditions [35]. An improvement would be to ex-
periment with other designs combining auditory and visual
messages displayed in the upper part of the primary flight dis-
play. Despite experimental limitations, our proof-of-concept
shows that straightforward solutions should be implemented
in today’s flight deck and contribute to enhance flight safety.
Since the remote eye tracking technology is available nowa-
days and its application in real flight conditions is possible
[10], it would be interesting to evaluate the eye tracking for
inferring pilot’s attentional state and for confirming the oc-
currence of cognitive conflict in future flight deck. This ad-
ditional inference would prevent from sending spurious mes-
sages (as occurred five times in our proof-of-concept testing
when pilots managed to rapidly diagnose autopilot behavior).
Moreover, this check could limit the effect of overreliance on
automation [26] as it would prevent pilots from systemati-
cally relying on synthesized messages.
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